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Abstract 
 
This paper is an empirical analysis of the likelihood of failure of inflation stabilization 
programs. Random effects logit models are estimated on a dataset of 39 programs 
implemented in 10 countries since the late 1950s, in order to determine which economic and 
political variables affect the probability of failure of stabilizations. Besides the well-known 
effects of real exchange rate appreciation, decreasing foreign reserves, budget deficits and 
slower GDP growth, I find that political instability, party fractionalization, undemocratic 
institutions, longer time in office and leftist incumbents increase the probability of failure of 
inflation stabilization plans. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of the present paper is to study empirically the causes of failure of 
inflation stabilization programs implemented in countries suffering from chronic inflation. 
This study builds upon and complements previous research undertaken by the author (Veiga, 
1999), which only considered the effects of internal macroeconomic variables on the 
probability of failure of a stabilization program. Although macroeconomic variables such as 
real exchange rates, budget deficits, foreign reserves and GDP growth are important 
determinants of a program’s outcome, they do not explain it completely. External financial 
assistance and external economic shocks should also be taken into account, and the 
theoretical literature on economic policy reform suggests that political variables play a very 
important role. According to this literature, the success or failure of reforms/stabilizations 
depends largely on political-economy factors within the countries that implement them. This 
implies that, even when economic performance is satisfactory, adverse political 
circumstances and institutions may lead to a program’s collapse. The main contribution of the 
empirical exercise undertaken here is to investigate how these economic and political forces 
affect the probability of failure of inflation stabilization programs. 
 In order to determine which economic and political variables affect the probability of 
failure of a stabilization plan, random effects logit models are estimated over a sample of 
quarterly data for 39 programs implemented in 10 countries, since the late 1950s. Results 
indicate that the following lead to a higher probability of failure: real effective exchange rate 
appreciation, budget deficits, losses of external reserves, slower GDP growth, political 
instability, party fractionalization, less pluralism/democracy (greater autocracy), longer time 
in office, and left-wing oriented incumbents. 
 The paper is structured as follows. The literature on the economic and political causes 
of failure of inflation stabilizations is summarized in section 2. Section 3 describes the data 
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and the econometric model, and section 4 describes the empirical results. Finally, section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Economic and political causes of failure of inflation stabilization 
It is well-known that stabilizations are not all alike and that each program has specific 
characteristics that help explain its success or failure. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify 
empirical regularities associated with fighting inflation in chronic inflation countries.1 
Exchange rate-based stabilizations (ERBS) are generally associated with: real appreciation of 
the domestic currency; deterioration of the trade balance and current account; initial increases 
in output and consumption followed by a slowdown; ambiguous response of domestic real 
interest rates; increase in real wages; failure to reduce the fiscal deficit dampens the reduction 
of inflation and makes real appreciation worse; and, the use of price and wage controls as an 
additional anchor does not seem to change the final result. Money-based stabilizations (MBS) 
are less common and their implications are more difficult to generalize. Nevertheless, the 
following stylized facts have been identified in the literature: slow convergence of inflation to 
the rate of monetary growth; real appreciation of the domestic currency; ambiguous behavior 
of the trade balance and current account; initial contraction of economic activity followed by 
a later expansion; initial increase in domestic real interest rates. 
 Dornbusch (1991) and Orphanides (1996) develop models that identify several factors 
that raise or lower the probability of failure of a plan. Adjustment effort, in the form of fiscal 
stabilization and slower money growth, and availability of foreign reserves (that are subject 
to stochastic shocks) are the main determinants of a plan’s probability of failure. Veiga’s 
(1999) model of balance of payments crises also shows that an ERBS may fail when the rate 
                                                 
1 See Calvo and Végh (1994, 1999), Kiguel and Leviatan (1991, 1992), Végh (1992) and Veiga (1999). 
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of money growth (that is determined by the budget deficit) is not consistent with a fixed 
exchange rate. The dynamics leading to the collapse of an ERBS involves real exchange rate 
appreciation, continuous depletion of foreign reserves, deteriorating trade balance and current 
account, and budget deficits. 
 External assistance from institutions like the IMF or the World Bank may also affect a 
program’s probability of failure (see Orphanides, 1996). By providing additional external 
reserves that help sustain a fixed exchange rate or a crawling peg, external assistance may 
contribute to the success of an ERBS. But, if the funding is used to reduce the adjustment 
effort, the probability of failure may not change or may even increase. 
A program’s final outcome can also be affected by external shocks. Increasing oil 
prices worsen the trade balance and the current account of oil importing countries, leading to 
a faster depletion of reserves. Higher international interest rates increase the cost of external 
funding and create pressure for the depreciation of the national currency, which may 
precipitate the failure of an ERBS. Finally, slower GDP growth abroad reduces the demand 
for a country’s exports, which worsens external accounts and GDP growth, possibly 
increasing the probability of failure of stabilization programs. 
 Although the economic variables referred to above are important determinants of the 
success or failure of inflation stabilization programs, they do not explain them completely. 
The theoretical literature on economic policy reform suggests that several political variables 
should also be taken into account. In Alesina and Drazen’s (1991) model, a lower degree of 
social cohesion or greater degrees of political polarization and fragmentation lead to greater 
delays of the implementation of successful stabilization programs2 (which are generally 
                                                 
2 Empirical support for their model is provided by Veiga (2000), who shows that higher fragmentation of the 
government or of the parliament lead to greater delays in the implementation of stabilization programs in 
situations of high inflation. 
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preceded by several failed attempts). According to Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), 
countries with more unstable and polarized political systems will have more inefficient tax 
structures and will rely more heavily on seigniorage. Thus, these models suggest that 
variables related to political instability, polarization and social cohesion should be included in 
an empirical analysis of the likelihood of successful stabilization. 
 Haggard and Kaufman (1992) argue that the security of governments and their 
independence from the short-run distributive political pressures has great effects on the level 
and variability of inflation over the long run. Furthermore, governments in less fragmented 
political systems, such as authoritarian regimes, are less exposed to those political pressures 
and need not waste time and energy building consensus for reform. Thus, stabilization 
programs may be easier to implement in authoritarian regimes. 
 The political business cycles literature suggests that time in office and ideological 
orientation of incumbents can also affect a plan’s probability of failure. Opportunistic 
politicians (Nordhaus, 1975) are more inclined to implement the tough and unpopular 
measures necessary for the success of stabilizations in the beginning of their terms. Thus, 
failure is more likely to happen as time in office increases. According to Hibbs’ (1977) 
partisan model, right-wing oriented incumbents care relatively more about inflation that left-
wing ones. This implies that success is more likely for right-wing governments, as these are 
more willing to make the necessary sacrifices to bring down inflation. 
 
3.  The data and the econometric model 
The first major issue to consider when constructing the dataset was to determine when 
a stabilization program had been implemented. The method consisted in searching the 
economics literature for information on the dates of implementation and failure/abandonment 
of stabilization programs undertaken in countries suffering from chronic inflation. The 44 
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stabilizations identified are described in Table 1. In that table, the starting and ending 
quarters, the type, and the main sources for identifying each stabilization plan are also 
indicated. The plans that are more often referred to in the literature and that represented the 
most serious attempts at reducing inflation (the “Major Stabilizations”) appear in bold. 
 
<< Insert Table 1 around here >> 
 
As previously stated, the objective of the present paper is to analyze how the 
probability of failure of a stabilization program depends on a set of economic and political 
variables. For that purpose, a separate observation for each quarter was created in which each 
plan was observed from implementation until failure, or censoring. Thus, each plan 
contributed a number of observations equal to its duration in quarters. For each quarter, and 
each plan, the dependent variable (FAIL) takes the value of one if the stabilization program 
failed in that quarter, and zero otherwise. If a plan did not fail, FAIL takes the value of zero 
for all observations of that plan. 
Since some stabilizations did not last more than one quarter, their causes of failure 
cannot be accurately analyzed with quarterly data. For that reason, three plans described in 
Table 1 where not considered in the dataset (Primavera I and BB, in Argentina, and the 
Gradualist plan, in Brazil) and another three where classified as a single program (Package 
Deals I, II and III, in Israel). Thus, the dataset used in the empirical analysis includes 39 
stabilizations.  
The second major issue concerning the construction of the dataset was to determine 
when a program that did not fail should no longer be observed (censored). One possibility 
would be to stop observing a plan in the last quarter covered in the dataset, that is, in the 
fourth quarter of 2000. Instead, stabilizations were censored after five years of successful 
  7
implementation. Here, I followed Calvo and Végh (1994), who set to five years the duration 
of the programs that had not failed in a shorter period of time. That is, after 20 quarters of 
successful implementation, a program is considered a success and is no longer observed. The 
reason for not censoring plans in the fourth quarter of 2000 is that the horizon after 
stabilization would be so long that macroeconomic performance in the final years would be 
essentially unrelated to the stabilization program under analysis.3 A five-year horizon avoids 
that problem and is long enough to thoroughly analyze each program. Furthermore, it 
produces little changes in the programs’ final outcomes.4 
In order to identify the economic and political variables that affect the probability of 
failure of a stabilization plan, a binary logit model was estimated, controlling for program 
specific random effects.5 I hypothesize that the unobserved hazard rate depends on the 
following explanatory variables:  
• A set of internal macroeconomic variables:6 
o Reer – Accumulated real effective exchange rate depreciation against the 10 
main trading partners since the beginning of stabilization. Higher values 
correspond to greater competitiveness, which improves the trade balance and 
should reduce the probability of failure; 
o TR – Quarterly percentage change in total reserves. An increase in reserves 
facilitates the implementation of an ERBS, and should thus decrease its 
probability of failure; 
                                                 
3 In the cases of the Bolivian and Israeli plans implemented in 1985, almost 15 years of data would be included 
if these programs were censored only in the fourth quarter of 2000. 
4 Of the stabilizations that failed until 2000, only 3 lasted more that 5 years. 
5 Controlling for fixed effects of programs is not possible because there are several stabilizations that do not fail: 
the dependent variable, FAIL, is equal to zero for all observations of these programs. 
6 These are the variables considered in Veiga (1999), with the exception that I now use real effective exchange 
rate depreciation instead of the real exchange rate appreciation against the US dollar. 
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o TR/Imp – Ratio of Total Reserves to Imports. A greater stock of reserves also 
decreases the probability of failure of an ERBS; 
o FB/GDP – Fiscal Balance (Government Budget Balance) as a percentage of 
GDP. Smaller budget deficits or greater surpluses are essential to the success 
of a stabilization. Thus, a negative coefficient is expected; 
o GDP - Growth of real GDP since the same quarter of the previous year. 
Higher economic growth reduces the costs of stabilization and thus contributes 
to its success; 
o CA/GDP – Current Account balance as a percentage of GDP. Improvements 
in external accounts lead to gains of reserves and reduce the probability of 
failure of stabilization plans; 
• Variables representing external assistance and external shocks: 
o IMF – Ongoing IMF arrangement. Financial assistance from the IMF can 
reduce the costs of a stabilization plan and thus contribute its success; 
o OIL – Index for the change in the price of oil since the beginning of the 
stabilization. Higher oil prices make the reduction of inflation harder and thus 
increase a plan’s probability of failure; 
o US_TBill – U.S. Treasury Bill rate. Higher international interest rates increase 
the costs of obtaining funds abroad and can contribute to a plan’s failure; 
o GDP_TP – GDP growth of trading partners. Higher growth of trading 
partners increases exports and could contribute to a plan’s success; 
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• A set of political variables: 
o GCrises – Number of government crises since the beginning of the 
stabilization program. This variable is the main proxy for political instability, 
which should increase the probability of failure of a stabilization; 
o FracInd – Party fractionalization index. Higher values are associated with a 
larger number of parties represented in parliament, higher political 
polarization, and greater difficulty to approve the tough measures necessary 
for the success of a stabilization (a positive coefficient is expected); 
o CompInd – Composite legislature index. Higher values are associated with 
greater effectiveness of the legislature, political pluralism and freedom. 
According to Haggard and Kaufman (1992), greater democracy increases a 
plan’s probability of failure; 
o QLCH – Quarters since the last change in government or election. Incumbents 
are expected to implement the toughest measures in the beginning of their 
terms (when QLCH is small). Thus, a positive coefficient is expected; 
o Right – Right or center-right oriented government. According to Hibbs (1977), 
rightist parties care relatively more about inflation than leftist ones. Thus, we 
expect a negative coefficient for this variable. 
All variables used in the empirical analysis, their sources, and the expected signs of the 
coefficients are described in table 2. 7 
<< Insert Table 2 around here >> 
                                                 
7 For some countries, only annual data are found on some variables, especially for earlier decades (1950s and 
1960s). The variables for which interpolation was used to generate quarterly values are: GDP, FB/GDP, 
CA/GDP and GDP_TP. Other interpolation methods such as “cubic mach last” of Eviews 4.1, were tried, but 
empirical results are virtually the same regardless of the method used. 
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4. Empirical results 
The results of logit models estimations are presented in Table 3. Since logit 
coefficients (β) are not easily interpretable, odds ratios ( βe ) are reported in brackets. These 
can be interpreted as follows: for a unit change in the explanatory variable xk, the odds are 
expected to change by a factor of exp(βk), holding all other variables constant. The pseudo-R2 
(or McFadden R2), the percentage of correct predictions, and the number of observations, 
failures and programs are indicated at the foot of the table. 
 
<< Insert Table 3 around here >> 
 
In column 1 only the set of internal macroeconomic variables is used, so that results 
can be easily compared to those of Veiga (1999). All variables except the change in reserves, 
TR,8 were lagged one period in order to account for simultaneity problems. Real effective 
exchange rate depreciation (Reer), budget surpluses (FB/GDP), increasing reserves (TR) and 
higher GDP growth (GDP) reduce the probability of failure of a stabilization program, while 
the stock of reserves (TR/Imp) and the current account balance as a percentage of GDP 
(CA/GDP) do not seem to matter. Except for these last two variables, results are in line with 
those of Veiga (1999).9 Results remain the same when TR/Imp and CA/GDP are excluded 
from the model (column 2). 
 The model of column 3 adds a set of external assistance and external shocks variables 
to the estimation of column 2. While increasing oil prices since the beginning of the 
                                                 
8 TR was not lagged because the big drops in reserves that often lead to the impossibility of maintaining an 
ERBS tend to happen in the quarter of failure and not before. 
9 It should be noted that this paper uses the real effective exchange rate against the 10 main trading partners, 
while Veiga (1999) used the real exchange rate against the USD. The latter will not be very informative if trade 
with the United States does not account for a high percentage of total trade. Thus, by using the real effective 
exchange rate, we account much better for the evolution of a country’s external competitiveness. 
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stabilization, OIL, increase the latter’s probability of failure, IMF arrangements (IMF), 10 U.S. 
Treasury Bill rates (US_TBill) and GDP growth of trading partners (GDP_TP) do not seem to 
affect that probability. Results regarding the effect of oil prices and the absence of effects of 
IMF assistance are in line with the findings of Ball and Rausser (1995), but results regarding 
the last two variables diverge from those of Hamann and Prati (2002) who found statistically 
significant effects of US interest rates and external demand. 
 In the estimation of column 4, the variables that were statistically significant in 
column 3 are used together with a set of political variables. TR and OIL are no longer 
statistically significant and all political variables are significant and have the expected signs. 
Political instability (more government crises – GCrises)11 and party fractionalization 
(FracInd) are positively related to the probability of failure, as suggested by the models of 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992). A greater degree 
of pluralism (CompInd) reduces that probability, contradicting Haggard and Kaufman (1992), 
who suggested that authoritarian regimes deal better with inflation reduction.12 Longer time 
in office (QLCH) and leftist orientation of incumbents (Right=0) increase the probability of 
failure of stabilizations. This provides some evidence in favor of the hypotheses that 
opportunistic incumbents do not which to implement tough measures towards the end of their 
terms (Nordhaus, 1975), and that right-wing parties/incumbents care relatively more about 
inflation than left-wing ones (Hibbs, 1977). These results are maintained in the estimation of 
column 5 in which OIL was not included. The only changes are that TR becomes statistically 
significant again and GCrises is more significant. 
                                                 
10 IMF was lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems. That is, IMF assistance could arrive in 
the quarter of failure as a last attempt to avoid that outcome. 
11 GCrises was also lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems. That is, a government crisis 
could result from the failure of a stabilization program. 
12 These findings concerning the effects of political instability and democracy/pluralism are in line with those 
obtained by Ball and Rausser (1995), for inflation reduction, and by Dollar and Svensson (2000), for the success 
or failure of structural adjustment programs supported by the World Bank. 
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 Comparing the results of columns 2 and 5, we can see that adding the set of political 
variables increases the pseudo-R2 by 11% and the percentage of correct predictions by 0.7. 
The effect of some of these variables on the probability of failure is considerable. For 
example, an additional government crisis is expected to change that probability by a factor of 
1.42, holding all other variables constant (equivalent to an increase of 42%). 
 Table 4 presents the results of a series of robustness tests that essentially consist in 
using available alternatives to the political variables referred to above. When the average 
number of government crises in a given quarter, Govcrise, or the sum of cabinet changes 
since the start of stabilization, CabChanges, are used instead of the sum of government crises 
since the beginning of the stabilization (GCrises), there is still evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that political instability is positively related to the probability of failure (see 
columns 1 and 2). Military dictatorships or authoritarian governments backed by the military 
(Type=1) and greater levels of autocracy (Polity<-5 =1) are associated with greater 
probabilities of failure (columns 3 and 4). Thus, when CompInd is replaced by any of these 
variables, there is still evidence that dictatorships/autocracies are bad for stabilization. 
Regarding the other political variables, FracInd and QLCH are not statistically significant in 
3 and 2 estimations, respectively. Thus, there is weaker evidence that greater fractionalization 
and time in office increase the probability of failure of a stabilization program. 
 
<< Insert Table 4 around here >> 
 
 The estimation of column 5 allows the probability of failure to be affected by the 
passage of time: the variable Dur_prog, that equals the number of quarters that have passed 
since the start of the stabilization, was added to the estimation of column 5 of Table 3. 
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Although the sign of the estimated coefficient indicates that programs are more likely to fail 
the longer they are in place, the variable is not statistically significant.13 14 
 Sensitivity analysis to alternative samples is reported in Table 5. All estimations use 
the same explanatory variables as that of column 5 of Table 3. In column 1, programs are still 
censored after five years of successful implementation (5-Year Limit), but only the 23 “Major 
Programs” are considered (those that appear in bold in Table 1). The signs of the coefficients 
remain the same but TR, GDP and QLCH are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, most 
of our conclusions regarding the effects of political variables remain the same. In the second 
and third estimations, programs were censored only after seven years of successful 
implementation. Results are almost the same than those obtained for the 5-year limit.15 The 
major difference is that FracInd is not statistically significant in the estimation for all 
programs. 
 
<< Insert Table 5 around here >> 
 
 Finally, I estimated the models censoring in the fourth quarter of 2000 the programs 
that had not failed until then. As previously stated, this implies considering almost 15 years 
of observations for the Bolivian and Israeli plans of 1985 and at least 9 years of observations 
for the other programs that were still under implementation in 2000. Using long horizons 
after stabilization has the problem that the inflationary performance in the last years of 
observations has little relation with the stabilization program that one wishes to analyze. 
                                                 
13 When using dummy variables for each year of implementation instead of Dur_Prog there is still no evidence 
of time effects. These, and other results not shown here, are available from the author upon request. 
14 Additional robustness tests not reported here were performed. They revealed that initial inflation and the 
nominal anchor chosen do not affect the probability of failure, and that adding economic variables such as 
exports, imports, debt service, domestic credit, and openness to trade does not significantly change the results. 
15 Compare the estimation for all programs with that of column 5 of Table 3 and the one for Major Programs 
with the first estimation of Table 5. Results of estimations using 4-year and 6-year limits are also very similar. 
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Although results concerning economic variables present little changes, those for political 
variables are weaker. Since GCrises was not statistically significant,16 it was replaced by 
Govcrise, which is significant, providing evidence that higher political instability increases 
the probability of failure. Of the other political variables, only the ideological orientation 
seems to matter. Rightist governments (Right=1) are associated with a smaller probability of 
failure in the estimation for all programs. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzed empirically the effects of economic and political variables on the 
probability of failure of inflation stabilization programs implemented in 10 countries since 
the late 1950s. Results regarding macroeconomic variables revealed that real effective 
exchange rate appreciation, higher budget deficits, loss of foreign exchange reserves and 
slower GDP growth contribute to the failure of stabilization attempts. These results are 
consistent with those of previous research undertaken by the author (Veiga, 1999) and with 
the stylized facts of stabilizations identified in the literature. 
The main contribution of the present study is to clearly show that political factors are 
also very important determinants of the success or failure of stabilization programs. There is 
empirical evidence that political instability, party fractionalization, autocracy (less pluralism 
or democracy), longer time in office and left-wing ideological orientation of incumbents lead 
to higher probabilities of failure of stabilization attempts. These results are consistent with the 
models of Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), 
according to which political instability, polarization and fragmentation are detrimental to 
stabilization. The hypothesis that authoritarian regimes are more capable of reducing inflation 
                                                 
16 When a longer horizon is used, a greater number of government crises may occur during a stabilization 
program even if political instability is not high. Thus, this variable may not adequately proxy political instability 
when we use many years of observations for each program.  
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because they can resist better to political pressures (see Haggard and Kaufman, 1992), is not 
supported. In fact, my results indicate exactly the opposite: more plural and democratic 
regimes are associated with lower probabilities of failure of stabilizations. Thus, although 
authoritarian regimes start stabilization programs faster in the presence of high inflation, as 
shown by Veiga (2000), they are not more capable to conclude them successfully. 
 The effects of external assistance and shocks were also analyzed. Results indicate that 
IMF arrangements, U.S. interest rates and GDP growth of trading partners do not affect a 
program’s probability of failure. Although increasing oil prices appear to be detrimental to 
stabilization when only economic variables are considered, they are not statistically 
significant when political variables are also included in the set of explanatory variables. 
Finally, initial inflation and the nominal anchor chosen do not affect a program’s probability 
of failure. 
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Table 1: Stabilization Programs 
Country Program dates/names Type Main Sources 
Argentina 1958:4 – 1959:2 
1959:3 – 1962:2 
1967:1 – 1970:2 
1973:3 – 1975:2 
1976:2 – 1978:3 
1978:4 – 1981:2 (Tablita) 
1985:2 – 1986:3 (Austral I) 
1986:3 – 1986:4 (Primavera I) 
1987:1 – 1987:2 (February) 
1987:4 – 1988:2 (Austral II) 
1988:3 – 1989:1 (Primavera II) 
1989:3 – 1989:4 (BB) 
1989:4 – 1991:1 (Bonex) 
1991:2 – 2002:1 (Convertibility) 
MBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
MBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
MBS 
ERBS 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1988) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1988) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Heyman (1991) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Bolivia 1982:4 – 1983:4 
1984:2 – 1984:3 
1985:1 – 1985:2 
1985:3 – present 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
Morales (1988) 
Morales (1988) 
Morales (1988) 
Morales (1988), Végh (1992) 
Brazil 1964:1 – 1968:3 
1986:1 – 1986:4 (Cruzado) 
1987:2 – 1988:1 (Bresser) 
1988:2 – 1988:2 (Gradualist) 
1989:1 – 1989:3 (Summer) 
1990:1 – 1991:1 (Collor) 
1994:3 – 1999:1 (Real) 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
MBS 
ERBS 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Kiguel and Leviatan (1991) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Ágénor and Montiel (1999) 
Chile 1975:2 – 1977:4 
1978:1 – 1982:2 (Tablita) 
MBS 
ERBS 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Dominican Republic 1990:3 - present MBS Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Israel 1980:4 – 1982:3 (Aridor I) 
1982:3 – 1983:3 (Aridor II) 
1983:4 – 1984:2 (Cohen-Orgad) 
1984:3 – 1984:3 (Package Deal I) 
1984:4 – 1985:1 (Package Deal II) 
1985:1 – 1985:2 (Package Deal III) 
1985:3 – present (Shekel) 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
Razin (1991) 
Razin (1991) 
Razin (1991) 
Razin (1991) 
Razin (1991) 
Razin (1991) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Mexico 1976:4 – 1982:1 
1987:4 – 1994:4 
ERBS 
ERBS 
Diaz and Tercero (1988) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Peru 1985:3 – 1988:3 
1990:3 - present 
ERBS 
MBS 
Agénor and Montiel (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Turkey 1980:1 – 1987:4 MBS Rodrik (1991) 
Uruguay 1960:4 – 1963:2 
1968:2 – 1971:4 
1978:4 – 1982:4 (Tablita) 
1990:4 - present 
MBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
ERBS 
Hoffmaister and Vegh (1996) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
Notes: - ERBS – Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization; MBS – Money-Based Stabilization. 
- The programs whose date/name appears in bold are considered “Major Stabilizations”. 
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Table 2: Description of the Main Variables Used 
Dependent variable: Expected 
Sign 
FAIL  = 1  if a stabilization program fails in the current quarter;      (Sources: see Table 1) 
= 0  otherwise. 
 
Independent Economic variables:  
Reer –Accumulated real effective exchange rate depreciation against the 10 main trading partners 
since the beginning of the stabilization: index number that takes the value of 100 for the 
first observation available (IFS and DOTS). 
- 
TR – Percentage quarterly change in total reserves (IFS). - 
TR/IMP – Total reserves as a percentage of imports (IFS). - 
FB/GDP – Fiscal Balance (Government Budget Balance) as a percentage of GDP (IFS). - 
CA/GDP – Current Account balance as a percentage of GDP (IFS). - 
GDP - Growth of Real GDP since the same quarter of the previous year (IFS, IBGE and INEGI). - 
IMF = 1 if there is an ongoing IMF program/arrangement, and =0 otherwise (IMF Annual Report 
and IMF Webpage). 
- 
OIL - Index for the change in the price of oil since the beginning of the stabilization (OECD). + 
US_TBill – U.S. Treasury Bill rate (IFS). + 
GDP_TP – Annual GDP growth of trading partners (WDI and DOTS). - 
Dur_Prog – Number of quarters since the beginning of the stabilization program (Table 1). + 
Independent political variables:  
GCrises – Number of government crises since the beginning of the stabilization program. A 
government crisis is any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of 
the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow (CNTS). 
+ 
Govcrise – Average number of government crises in the current quarter (the value for the current 
year divided by 4). (CNTS) 
+ 
CabChanges – Number of cabinet changes since the beginning of the stabilization program. Refers 
to the number of times in which a new premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are 
occupied by new ministers. (CNTS) 
+ 
FracInd – Party Fractionalization index = ∑ 21 it , where ti is the proportion of members associated 
with the ith party in the lower house of the legislature (transformation of the variable 
included in the CNTS). 
+ 
CompInd – Composite Legislature Index: simple, non-factorial, measure of political pluralism 
(CNTS). 
+ 
Polity<-5 – High autocracy: = 1 if the Polity score is below -5, and =0 otherwise. The variable 
Polity was taken from the Polity IV Database. 
- 
Type – Type of regime: = 1 for a military dictatorship or an authoritarian government backed by the 
military, and =0 otherwise. 
- 
QLCH - Number of quarters since the last change in government or elections. + 
Right = 1 for a right or center-right oriented government, and =0 otherwise. - 
Sources (presented in parenthesis): 
- IFS: International Financial Statistics – IMF; DOTS: Direction of Trade Statistics – IMF; WDI: World 
Development Indicators – World Bank; CNTS: Cross National Time Series Data Archive; 
- Type, QLCH and Right: Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the World, several issues; Haggard and 
Kaufman (1992); and World Europa Yearbook, several issues. 
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Table 3: Logit Models Results 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Reer (-1) -.017 
[.98] 
(-2.33)** 
-.015 
[.99] 
(-2.34)** 
-.015 
[.98] 
(-2.01)** 
-.023 
[.98] 
(-2.01)** 
-.022 
[.98] 
(-1.94)* 
FB/GDP(-1) -.125 
[.88] 
(-3.99)*** 
-.114 
[.89] 
(-4.11)*** 
-.154 
[.86] 
(-4.06)*** 
-.176 
[.84] 
(-4.23)*** 
-.176 
[.84] 
(-4.25)*** 
TR -.018 
[.98] 
(-2.28)** 
-.018 
[.98] 
(-2.34)** 
-.017 
[.98] 
(-2.08)** 
-.016 
[.98] 
(-1.62) 
-.017 
[.98] 
(-1.86)* 
TR/IMP(-1) -.057 
[.94] 
(-.27) 
    
GDP (-1) -.107 
[.90] 
(-2.46)** 
-.108 
[.90] 
(-2.56)*** 
-.125 
[.88] 
(-2.72)*** 
-.110 
[.90] 
(-2.25)** 
-.111 
[.90] 
(-2.31)** 
CA/GDP(-1) .074 
[1.07] 
(.89) 
    
IMF(-1)   -.251 
[.78] 
(.60) 
  
OIL   .015 
[1.02] 
(2.25)** 
-.001 
[1.00] 
(-.09) 
 
US_TBill   -.173 
[.84] 
(-1.54) 
  
GDP_TP   .214 
[1.24] 
(1.25) 
  
GCrises (-1)    .346 
[1.41] 
(1.90)* 
.353 
[1.42] 
(2.05)** 
FracInd    .399 
[1.49] 
(1.85)* 
.383 
[1.47] 
(1.76)* 
CompInd    -.264 
[0.77] 
(-2.60)*** 
-.265 
[0.77] 
(-2.84)*** 
QLCH    .070 
[1.07] 
(1.90)* 
.065 
[1.07] 
(1.80)* 
Right    -1.811 
[.16] 
(-2.96)*** 
-1.903 
[.15] 
(-3.17)*** 
Pseudo R2 .17 .16 .19 .27 .27 
% Correct predictions 93.08 92.67 92.64 93.58 93.37 
No. Observations 419 423 408 374 377 
Failures / Programs 29 / 39 30 / 39 28 / 38 27 / 38 28 / 39 
Sources: see tables 1 and 2. 
Notes:  
• Odds ratios are in brackets and t-statistics are in parentheses;  
• Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
• Models estimated with a constant, controlling for random effects of programs. 
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Table 4: Robustness Tests 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Reer (-1) -.028 
[.97] 
(-2.78)*** 
-.018 
[.98] 
(-1.72)** 
-.019 
[.98] 
(-1.72)** 
-.017 
[.98] 
(-1.51) 
-.015 
[.98] 
(-1.28) 
FB/GDP(-1) -.143 
[.87] 
(-3.78)*** 
-.181 
[.83] 
(-4.30)*** 
-.168 
[.84] 
(-4.25)*** 
-.162 
[.85] 
(-4.26)*** 
-.202 
[.82] 
(-4.34)*** 
TR -.022 
[.98] 
(-2.54)** 
-.018 
[.98] 
(-1.96)** 
-.018 
[.98] 
(-1.99)** 
-.019 
[.98] 
(-2.12)** 
-.017 
[.98] 
(-1.82)* 
GDP (-1) -.084 
[.92] 
(-1.75)* 
-.113 
[.90] 
(-2.30)** 
-.122 
[.89] 
(-2.59)*** 
-.119 
[.89] 
(-2.55)** 
-.122 
[.89] 
(-2.44)** 
GCrises (-1)   .374 
[1.45] 
(2.18)** 
.433 
[1.54] 
(2.45)** 
.298 
[1.35] 
(1.70)* 
Govcrise (-1) 2.288 
[9.86] 
(2.79)*** 
    
CabChanges (-1)  .670 
[1.95] 
(1.85)* 
   
FracInd .243 
[1.28] 
(1.05) 
.147 
[1.16] 
(.63) 
.324 
[1.38] 
(1.74)* 
.255 
[1.29] 
(1.40) 
.410 
[1.51] 
(1.79)* 
CompInd -.180 
[.84] 
(-2.15)** 
-.244 
[.78] 
(-2.61)*** 
  -.291 
[.75] 
(-2.95)*** 
Type   2.289 
[9.87] 
(2.57)*** 
  
Polity<-5    2.128 
[8.39] 
(2.51)** 
 
QLCH .073 
[1.08] 
(2.05)** 
.083 
[1.07] 
(2.17)** 
.056 
[1.06] 
(1.60) 
.045 
[1.05] 
(1.28) 
.060 
[1.06] 
(1.70)* 
Right -1.292 
[.27] 
(-2.37)** 
-1.942 
[.14] 
(-3.24)*** 
-2.062 
[.13] 
(-3.11)*** 
-1.823 
[.16] 
(-3.01)*** 
-2.087 
[.12] 
(-3.33)*** 
Dur_Prog     .084 
[1.09] 
(1.51) 
Pseudo R2 .27 .27 .26 .26 .28 
% Correct predictions 93.55 92.84 93.09 92.83 93.10 
No. Observations 403 377 391 391 377 
Failures / Programs 28 / 39 28 / 39 29 / 39 29 / 39 28 / 39 
Sources: see tables 1 and 2. 
Notes:  
• Odds ratios are in brackets and t-statistics are in parentheses;  
• Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
• Models estimated with a constant, controlling for random effects of programs. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis 
 5-year 
Limit 
7-year Limit No Time Limit 
 Major 
Programs 
All 
Programs 
Major 
Programs 
All 
Programs 
Major 
Programs 
Reer (-1) -.034 
[.97] 
(-2.21)** 
-.024 
[.98] 
(-2.10)** 
-.034 
[.97] 
(-2.20)** 
-.023 
[.98] 
(-2.55)** 
-.021 
[.98] 
(-1.94)* 
FB/GDP(-1) -.190 
[.83] 
(-1.79)* 
-.188 
[.83] 
(-4.49)*** 
-.184 
[.83] 
(-1.73)* 
-.139 
[.87] 
(-4.03)*** 
-.132 
[.88] 
(-1.47) 
TR -.013 
[.99] 
(-1.19) 
-.019 
[.98] 
(-2.08)** 
-.014 
[.97] 
(-1.23) 
-.024 
[.98] 
(-2.95)*** 
-.019 
[.98] 
(-1.89)* 
GDP (-1) -.074 
[.93] 
(-1.10) 
-.108 
[.90] 
(-2.24)** 
-.077 
[.93] 
(-1.14) 
-.078 
[.92] 
(-1.77)* 
-.033 
[.97] 
(-.54) 
GCrises (-1) .395 
[1.48] 
(1.94)* 
.282 
[1.33] 
(1.73)* 
.330 
[1.39] 
(1.72)* 
  
Govcrise (-1)    2.093 
[8.11] 
(2.67)*** 
1.999 
[7.38] 
(2.00)** 
FracInd .462 
[1.59] 
(1.81)* 
.363 
[1.44] 
(1.59) 
.470 
[1.60] 
(1.79)* 
-.031 
[.97] 
(-.12) 
.024 
[1.02] 
(.09) 
CompInd -.326 
[.72] 
(-2.65)*** 
-.290 
[.75] 
(-3.05)*** 
-.360 
[.70] 
(-2.81)*** 
-.105 
[.90] 
(-1.31) 
-.129 
[.88] 
(-1.37) 
QLCH .030 
[1.03] 
(.58) 
.066 
[1.07] 
(1.89)* 
.022 
[1.02] 
(.44) 
.053 
[1.05] 
(1.60) 
-.013 
[.99] 
(-.26) 
Right -2.033 
[.13] 
(-1.97)** 
-2.112 
[.12] 
(-3.46)*** 
-2.314 
[.10] 
(-2.19)** 
-.941 
[.39] 
(-1.97)** 
-.471 
[.62] 
(-.62) 
Pseudo R2 .21 .29 .22 .23 .15 
% Correct predictions 95.65 93.51 96.13 94.32 96.36 
No. Observations 299 416 336 475 385 
Failures / Programs 13 / 23 29 / 39 13 / 23 31 / 39 15 / 23 
Sources: see tables 1 and 2. 
Notes:  
• Odds ratios are in brackets and t-statistics are in parentheses;  
• Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%;  
• Models estimated with a constant, controlling for random effects of programs. 
 
 
